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Declining corporate tax rates in Europe during the
past decades have fuelled fears of tax competition.
Indeed, governments successively undercut each
others’ tax rates in order to attract mobile tax bases.
This is considered to be harmful for European wel-
fare since it might create a race-to-the-bottom,which
could ultimately erode corporate tax revenues and
impose a threat to the financing of the European
welfare states. The fears of tax competition have
been played down, however, by observations on cor-
porate tax revenues as these have remained remark-
ably stable over time. Yet, new research shows that
the revenue implications of corporate tax competi-
tion do not show up in lower corporate tax revenue
but in lower personal tax revenue. This article ex-
plains how this occurs and estimates the magnitude
of its impact.
The corporate tax rate-revenue puzzle
Statutory corporate tax rates in Europe have been
falling ever since the early 1980s. The left panel of
Figure 1 shows this by means of GDP-weighted aver-
ages in Europe. The average rate in the EU-15 has
dropped from 48 percent in 1985 to below 30 percent
in 2006. In the new member
states, it has fallen from around
36 percent in 1993 to 18 percent
in 2006.
While rates have fallen, cor-
porate tax revenues have re-
mained remarkably stable dur-
ing the past decades.This is shown in the right panel
of Figure 1.In fact – although heavily influenced by
the economic cycle – corporate tax revenues, ex-
pressed as a percentage of the gross domestic prod-
uct,have increased broadly from about 2 percent in
the early 1980s to between 21/2 and 3 percent in
more recent years.
The discrepancy between falling corporate tax rates
and increasing corporate tax revenues is generally
seen as the consequence of a widening of the corpo-
rate tax bases. Indeed, corporate tax rate reductions
have been accompanied by base-broadening policies
in many OECD countries, e.g. by means of reduced
investment tax credits, loss offset rules, interest
deductibility and fiscal depreciation. If this ex-
plained the corporate tax rate-revenue paradox,
fears for a race to the bottom would indeed be mis-
placed.Yet, studies on average effective tax rates of
companies reveal that these have been falling too
(Devereux et al. 2002). It suggests that base-broad-
ening policies have not made up for the adverse rev-
enue implications of rate reduction and that the rate-
revenue puzzle remains partly unresolved.
Recent studies have tried to seek alternative expla-
nations for the puzzle.For instance,Auerbach (2006)
suggests that the reduction in losses that can be off-
set can partly explain the rise in the implicit tax rate
on corporations in the United States. Becker and
Fuest (2007) argue that pre-tax profitability in the
economy has increased in light of globalisation, thus
causing higher profit shares and a broadening of the
corporate tax base. Finally, Devereux et al. (2004)
suggest that a rising share of the financial sector in
the economy is a potential explanation for the grow-
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plored an alternative explana-
tion for the puzzle: income shift-
ing from personal to corporate
income (De Mooij and Nico-
dème 2008). In particular, entre-
preneurs need to decide on the
legal form of doing business.
This choice can be influenced by
the difference between personal
and corporate income taxes.
Indeed, if entrepreneurs are
taxed more lightly under the
corporate tax regime than under
the personal tax regime, they
will be encouraged to shift their
legal form towards incorpora-
tion. Some authors find that the
corporate share of business income has indeed
increased during the past decades in a number of
countries.For instance,Weichenrieder (2005) reports
that in Austria, the corporate share increased from
50 percent in the mid-1970s to 75 percent today. In
Germany,it rose from less than 40 percent to around
55 percent.The question is, however, how important
are taxes for the incorporation decision, given that
various non-tax factors are usually important in the
firm’s choice of incorporation as well. If taxes turn
out to be important,it will shed new light on the cor-
porate rate-revenue puzzle and the consequences of
tax competition.In particular,if falling corporate tax
rates under the pressure of tax competition induce
entrepreneurs to change their legal form from the
non-corporate into the corporate form, the revenue
implications will show up partly in lower personal
tax revenue rather than lower corporate tax revenue.
The overall adverse revenue implications from tax
competition might then be more substantial than
would be envisaged from observations on only cor-
porate tax-to-GDP ratios.
European data on legal form of business
In our analysis on the impact of taxes on the degree
of incorporation, we exploit panel data from
Eurostat on business demography in Europe. It con-
tains aggregate information on 17 European coun-
tries, for 6 years between 1997 and 2003, and for
60 sectors (see Schrör 2005 for a description) on
firms in three different legal forms:
• Personally owned firms that have no limit to per-
sonal liability, i.e., sole proprietorships (SP) that
are subject to personal taxation.
• Private or publicly quoted joint stock companies
with limited liability (LL) for those owning
shares. This category captures corporations that
are subject to corporate taxation.
• Partnerships (PA),consisting of personally owned
limited and unlimited liability partnerships.
Included are also other legal forms, such as co-
operatives and associations. Partnerships belong
to a hybrid category of companies that can be
taxed under either the corporate income tax
regime or the personal income tax.
Because of the uncertainty about the tax treatment
of partnerships, we concentrate on an indicator that
divides the share of enterprises registered as limited
liability (LL) companies by the sum of companies
with limited liability (LL) and personal liability firms
(SP), i.e. CORP = LL/(LL+SP).1
The data contain information on the number of
active firms and the number of enterprise births per
year.Apart from count data on the number of firms,
there are data on employment shares in each of the
three legal forms, both for active firms and enter-
prise births. We therefore consider four indicators
for the share of the corporate sector in the economy:
• The corporate share in the total number of active
firms.
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1 In De Mooij and Nicodeme (2008),we also consider shares where
we add partnerships to either corporate or non-corporate firms.
The results of the regression analysis remain qualitatively
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• The corporate share in the total number of new
firms.
• The corporate employment share of active firms.
• The corporate employment share of new firms.
Figure 2 shows the mean corporate share of business
for all four indicators,i.e.averaged over all countries,
years and sectors. It shows that the corporate share
in terms of the number of companies (36 percent for
active and 37 percent for new firms) is substantially
smaller than the corporate share measured in terms
of employment (82 percent for active firms and 59
percent for new firms).Hence,corporations,on aver-
age,employ more people than companies in the non-
corporate form. This holds in particular for more
mature enterprises.
The upper panel of Figure 3 shows the mean of the
corporate employment share of active firms per sec-
tor. In general, we observe that the incorporation
rate exceeds 90 percent in mining,utilities,the finan-
cial sector and manufacturing. It is around 70 per-
cent in construction and some service sectors (hotels
and restaurants, health and social work, social activi-
ties, retail).
The degree of incorporation differs also across coun-
tries, which is shown in the lower panel of Figure 3.
It shows the corporate employment share of active
firms for all 17 countries in the sample, averaged
across years and sectors. The employment share
varies between 63 percent in the Czech Republic to
97 percent in Estonia. Note, however, that before
2001 Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia only considered
larger firms and thus used different definitions of
corporate share. Nevertheless, Finland and Lu-
xembourg feature corporate employment shares of
over 90 percent.
How important is income shifting?
To assess the systematic impact of taxes on incorpo-
ration decisions,we regressed the degree of incorpo-
ration to the tax differential between the corporate
and the non-corporate form. Following Mackie-
Mason and Gordon (1997) and Goolsbee (2004) we
used the statutory corporate tax on small business
and the top personal income tax rate to approximate
the relevant tax rates for the respective legal forms.
In doing the regressions, we included several dum-
mies and control variables such as the minimum cap-
ital required to start a business and the number of
procedures required to start a business.
From the regressions,we inferred a quantitative indi-
cation on the impact of taxes on incorporation deci-
sions. In particular, we found that a larger tax differ-
ence between personal and corporate taxes exerted
a significantly positive effect on the degree of incor-
poration.This is consistent with income shifting.The
so-called semi-elasticity of the tax share, measuring
the percentage change in the corporate tax share in
response to a 1 percentage-point change in the tax
differential between corporate and the non-corpo-
rate sector, was found to be equal to 1.0. This value
can be compared to previous studies, using US data.
Some of these find smaller effects of taxes. For
instance,with the same specification and data for the
US,Goolsbee (2004) reported a semi-elasticity of 0.4
for the corporate employment share.MacKie-Mason
and Gordon (1997) considered the share of corpo-
rate assets in the US and found a somewhat lower
semi-elasticity between 0.03 and 0.2. Other studies,
however,have reported larger elasticities for income
shifting. For example, estimates by Gordon and
Slemrod (2002) suggested that a 1 percentage-point
increase in the tax differential between corporate
and personal taxes increased reported labour in-
come by 3 percent. Using data for the OECD, Fuest
and Weichenrieder (2002) estimated that a 1 per-
cent-point reduction in the corporate tax rate
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Figure 3increased the fraction of corporate savings in total
private savings by some 2.6 percent.
Policy implications
Our result has important policy implications. For
instance, for an average European country, it indi-
cates that for each euro ex-ante reduction of corpo-
rate income tax, 24 euro cents are regained in terms
of corporate tax revenue through income shifting
from personal to the corporate tax. Hence, the cor-
porate tax relief that is initially estimated to cost one
euro will cost only 76 euro cents after firms have
responded with their choice of legal form. However,
this regain in corporate tax revenue will come at the
expense of a decline in personal tax revenue.
Therefore, this behavioural effect does not create a
regain in government revenue in general.
The elasticity of income shifting via the legal form of
doing business is also large compared to other behav-
ioural consequences of corporate taxes. De Mooij
(2005) reviewed the empirical evidence on several of
these effects, including distortions in investment, the
financial structure of companies,international invest-
ment location and profit allocation by multinationals.
He has found that the largest revenue effects are
related to the channels of foreign direct investment
(revenue gain of 12 percent for an average EU coun-
try) and international profit allocation (revenue gain
between 20 and 30 percent). The channels of invest-
ment and financial structure yield much smaller
effects. Our estimate of 24 percent for income shift-
ing via the legal form of business is large compared
to the other behavioural effects.
Using our estimate,we have sim-
ulated the impact of tax changes
on the corporate tax-to-GDP ra-
tio. In doing so, we first compute
the tax difference between the
top personal tax and the reduced
corporate tax averaged for the
EU-15 between 1991 and 2006.
It is shown in the left panel of
Figure 4.We see that the average
tax gap rose from around 12 per-
centage points in the early 1990s
to more than 20 percentage
points in recent years.This is pri-
marily the result of decreasing
corporate tax rates, which fell
from an average of 41 percent to
27 percent. The right panel of Figure 4 shows how
this might have influenced the corporate-tax-rev-
enue-to-GDP ratio. In particular, it shows two alter-
native developments of the tax-to-GDP ratio in the
EU-15 between 1991 and 2004.The first is the devel-
opment of the actual corporate tax-to-GDP ratio.
The other line shows the simulated development of
the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio if the tax gap
between personal and corporate taxation had
remained unchanged since 1991. It is constructed by
subtracting the revenue effect associated with
income shifting from the personal to the corporate
tax induced by the rising tax gap since 1991 from the
actual tax-to-GDP ratio.The difference between this
line and the actual corporate tax-to-GDP ratio thus
yields insight into the corporate tax gain from
income shifting. We see from the right panel of Fi-
gure 4 that this gain has gradually increased over
time to around 0.25 percentage points in recent
years. The legal form choice in combination with a
rising tax gap since the early 1990s thus explains
0.25 percentage points of the stabilization of the cor-
porate tax-to-GDP ratio during the past 15 years.
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